One interesting difference I've noticed between the West and China, that few speak about, is the difference in approach when it comes to narrative management.

To a large extent the West's approach is to change the narrative in order to change reality, whereas China's approach is almost the opposite: change reality in order to change the narrative. It's basically materialism vs idealism.

Take two concrete examples. On the West's side, a fantastic illustration is presidential campaign slogans like Obama's \"yes we can\" or Trump's \"make America great again.\" Pure narrative stuff, extremely aspirational and grandiose, all about believing change into existence.

And what change exactly? These slogans can mean many things to many different people and that's the entire point: it's a blank canvas where everyone can project their own hopes, the goal being to win a battle of words, reality comes later.

There are very deep roots to this. In fact John 1:1 (first verse of first chapter of the Gospel of John) states: \"In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God\"! Talk about foundational!

In Chinese culture, by contrast, talk is cheap, vulgar even. This really surprised me at the beginning with my wife (whom I met already more than 20 years ago!). She was really uncomfortable, even borderline annoyed when I was telling her that I loved her. In her mind, you just don't say those things, rather you should act to demonstrate them.

And this is the case in most Chinese family. It's rare to say \"I love you\". But in exchange the devotion and dedication Chinese parents and grandparents will demonstrate to their offspring is absolutely unparalleled.

In Chinese culture it's very much about proving your love. Speaking about love is borderline insulting, or at least seen in a somewhat manipulative light, as if you need to convince someone of something that should be obvious through your behavior.

Same thing with the government. Many people think the Chinese government are good at propaganda when in truth they're remarkably unsophisticated at it - they'll lift 800 million people out of poverty but really struggle to articulate a compelling story around it. They'll share statistics and show before/after photos, as if the reality is all the narrative you need. And maybe they're right 🤷

This also probably has a lot to do with why Chinese people find the US-style selection of president so foreign. \"You mean you select someone based on what they SAY? But they'll say anything to get elected\" is basically the view. To the Chinese, a meritocratic system whereby those who have demonstrated an ability to get things done during years get progressively promoted makes way more sense.

This also has very deep philosophical roots. Shen Buhai, a foundational 4th century BCE political philosopher had this famous dictum: \"The sage ruler depends upon methods, not on his sagacity. He employs technique, not theory.\" (philpapers.org/archive/MATHID…) In other words sage rulers shouldn't persuade but focus on methods and techniques that produce measurable results.

This is similar to the concept of 无为 (wu wei), which influenced Daoist thought, where effective action comes from aligning with how things actually work. Reality comes first, not the word.

This has plenty of concrete consequences, and probably is in no small way a reason why Marx's historical materialism - the idea that material conditions and economic relations form the base that determines the ideological superstructure - did resonate strongly in China, and less in the West.

And this translates also, to some extent, to the current change of the world order. As I argued in my new article yesterday (open.substack.com/pub/arnaudbert…) we're currently witnessing a shift where \"the map is reasserting itself against the narrative\", where geography is starting again to matter more than stories (when, during a long time, being a “democracy” or an “ally” or part of the “rules-based order” determined your place in the world).

This, no doubt, is in no small way a vindication that these old 2500-year-old Chinese thinkers might have been onto something.